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@@ -62,3 +62,14 @@ On the other hand a regular base station using encryption can also be verified t
These approaches are not strictly passive since they require another participant to become active.
Although not strictly passive the \gls{icds} would still be invisible thus fulfilling the premise of not being uncovered itself.
+\paragraph{}This thesis analysed the threats that an IMSI catcher poses an which security flaws are responsible for its success.
+The main security flaw used in \gls{gsm}, namely authentication not being mutual, is fixed in the next generation \gls{umts} networks.
+However the topic will be of importance for years to come since as long as \gls{umts} coverage is not complete mobile phones will continue to have a fallback mechanism to look for \gls{gsm} cells when no \gls{umts} cells are available.
+To force a mobile phone to fall back to \gls{gsm} an IMSI catcher operator could jam the \gls{umts} frequency band and wait until the \gls{ms} connects.
+
+The results show that it is possible to identify suspicious base stations and therefore lessen the thread of being caught.
+
+We presented, with the \gls{icds}, a step into the direction of more security aware systems.
+A step that could and should also be taken by telephone manufacturers when designing the firmware and operating system for their next device.
+
+